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In the past four decades, women have made major inroads into occupations previ-ously dominated by men. This paper examines whether occupational feminization is accompanied by a decline in wages: Do workers suffer a wage penalty if they remain 
in, or move into, feminizing occupations? We analyze this question over the 1990s and 
2000s in Britain, Germany, and Switzerland, using longitudinal panel data to estimate 
individual fixed effects for men and women. Moving from an entirely male to an entirely 
female occupation entails a loss in individual earnings of 13 percent in Britain, 7 percent 
in Switzerland, and 3 percent in Germany. The impact of occupational feminization on 
wages is not linear, but sets apart occupations holding more than 60 percent of women. 
Moving into such female occupations incurs a wage penalty. Contrary to the prevailing 
idea in economics, differences in productivity—human capital, job-specific skills, and 
time investment—do not fully explain the wage gap between male and female occupa-
tions. The wage penalty associated with working in a female occupation is also much 
larger where employer discretion is greater—in the private sector—than where wage-
setting is guided by formal rules—the public sector. These findings suggest that wage 
disparities across male and female occupations are due to gender devaluation.
Introduction
Over the past four decades, women’s labor-market participation has increased 
continuously in the Western world. The growing number of employed women has 
thus led to a series of occupations becoming more “female.” Professions in health-
care, law, and human resources are examples of higher-level occupations in which 
women have greatly increased their employment share. Postal clerks and bakers 
represent lower-level occupations that have feminized.
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The question raised in this paper is whether occupational feminization is 
accompanied by a decline in wages. At the aggregate level, the concern is whether 
increasingly female jobs such as physicians, teachers, or social workers lose 
ground in the occupational earnings hierarchy. At the individual level, the issue at 
stake is whether workers who remain in, or move into, feminizing occupations 
suffer a wage penalty.
In the literature, several views have challenged each other over this question. 
One view is based on neoclassical economics and stresses differential investment 
into skill acquisition and paid work between male- and female-dominated occu-
pations (e.g., Becker 1985; Tam 1997; Polavieja 2008, 2012). This argument 
expects employers to pay lower wages in female occupations on a rational basis; 
productivity in these occupations is lower, as workers accumulate less specialized 
human capital and adjust their working time to fit with childcare and household 
arrangements.
A second view, often called “cultural devaluation,” believes that, aside from 
productivity, perceptions of the differential status that men and women deserve 
determine wages (e.g., Sørensen 1994; England, Allison, and Wu 2007). The basic 
idea is that women’s work is of lower value than men’s work. As a result, occupa-
tions that feminize are assigned lower wages because women are thought to 
deserve lower earnings than men.
A third view highlights conflictual power relations and argues that men are 
better organized in trade unions and possess more bargaining power than women 
(Jacobs and Steinberg 1990; Arulampalam, Booth, and Bryan 2007). Unioniza-
tion is seen as a closure mechanism, by which unions act to accrue higher wages 
for the incumbents of some occupations. The effect of such a strategy should be 
higher for craft and operative occupations than service or clerical occupations 
(Weeden 2002, 89). The rationale for lower pay in female occupations would in 
this way have less to do with differential perceptions of worth, and rather be that 
male-dominated occupations are better positioned to garner higher wages.
The aim of our paper is to analyze these competing expectations of the impact 
that occupational feminization has on wages. Our research tries to advance the 
literature in two ways. First, our focus is on three West European countries— 
Britain, Germany, and Switzerland—rather than on the United States. While the 
influence of occupational feminization on earnings has been repeatedly studied 
for the United States, only a handful of quantitative studies exists for Europe (de 
Ruijter [2003] for the Netherlands; Grönlund and Magnusson [2013] for Swe-
den;  Perales [2013] for the UK; Polavieja [2008] for Spain). Our study’s com-
parative design allows us to test whether occupational feminization affects wages 
similarly across countries—which is uncertain given that the institutional context 
in which women establish their careers in male-dominated occupations differs 
substantially across Europe (Le Feuvre 2010). Labor markets with more dis-
persed wage distributions and less institutional interference, such as the United 
States and Britain, may feature higher levels of wage devaluation of female occu-
pations than Germany or Switzerland (Mandel and Semyonov 2006).
A second innovation is the study’s longitudinal design. We use data stemming 
from three leading individual-level panel studies: the British Household Panel 
 Survey (BHPS) 1991–2009, the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 1991–2010, 
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and the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) 1999–2011. This design contrasts with the 
European studies quoted above (except Perales 2013) and several influential 
American studies (e.g., Sørensen 1994; Tam 1997; Tomaskovic-Devey and 
Scraggs 2002) that are all based on cross-sectional data. The few existing longi-
tudinal studies for the United States use the National Longitudinal Survey and are 
thus limited to short timespans and samples of young people (England et al. 
1988; Gerhart and El Cheikh 1991; MacPherson and Hirsch 1995). Alternatively, 
they are set at the aggregate level of occupations, and are thereby unable to con-
trol for individual-level differences between workers (Catanzarite 2003; England, 
Allison, and Wu 2007; Levanon, England, and Allison 2009). The crucial advan-
tage that longitudinal studies have over cross-sectional analyzes is that they 
enable the researcher to use fixed-effects estimators to control for time-constant 
unobserved heterogeneity between people. In our case, this allows us to cancel 
out different ingrained preferences, capabilities, and motivations, which affect 
both a worker’s decision to enter male- or female-dominated occupations, and his 
or her earnings potential over the life course.
Our paper is structured as follows. Section 2 maps out the theoretical argu-
ments as to why workers in female-dominated occupations should earn lower 
wages than in male-dominated ones and then details our hypotheses. Section 3 
presents our data and estimation method and discusses the advantage of using 
panel data. Section 4 shows descriptive evidence and the fixed-effects estimations. 
The concluding section sums up our findings.
Mechanisms Linking Occupational Feminization to Wages
Empirical research has consistently found that occupations with larger shares of 
women pay lower wages. The more robust studies use individual-level panel 
data with fixed effects and focus on the American labor market of the 1970s and 
1980s. After controlling for differences in human capital, they find that moving 
from a completely male to a completely female occupation leads to a wage 
decrease for women of between 4 (Gerhart and El Cheikh 1991, 69), 8 (England 
et al. 1988, 554), and 9 percent (MacPherson and Hirsch 1995, 446). For men, 
the wage penalty for moving out of a completely male into a completely female 
occupation is somewhat higher and ranges between 9 (MacPherson and Hirsch 
1995, 446), 10 (England et al. 1988, 554), and 19 percent (Gerhart and El 
Cheikh 1991, 69). American panel studies that use occupation instead of the 
individual as the unit of analysis find that earnings are between 3 to 5 (England, 
Allison, and Wu 2007, 1250) and 6 to 10 percent (Levanon, England, and  Allison 
2009, 885) lower in female-dominated occupations than in mixed-gender occu-
pations, having controlled for skill differences. An American analysis of changes 
in an occupation’s gender composition and wages between 1970 and 2007 finds 
male earnings to decline by 3 to 5 percent with increasing shares of female 
entrants, with higher-level occupations being most negatively affected by femi-
nization (Mandel 2013, 1200).
Why should occupations with a majority of female workers pay lower wages 
than occupations with a majority of male workers? While the debate has intro-
duced several causal mechanisms, the core issue is simple and divides explanations 
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into two camps. One camp considers wage disparities between male and female 
occupations to solely reflect differences in individual human capital and produc-
tivity. Gender pay gaps are thus seen as a spurious byproduct of the different 
endowments and preferences of occupational incumbents. The other camp consid-
ers wage disparities to be rooted in perceptions of unequal worth, and therefore 
points to collective labor-market discrimination against women. The idea is that 
gendered allocation in the labor market gives way to valuative discrimination, 
whereby employers tend to undervalue “female” as opposed to “male” work 
(Petersen and Saporta 2004). In addition, a less prominent but relevant explana-
tion highlights asymetric power resources in the labor market and focuses on dif-
ferences in collective organization and wage bargaining.1
Gender Differences in Job-Specific Skills
The first camp draws heavily on Gary Becker’s (1985, S36) New Home Economics 
and emphasizes the importance of household specialization among partners. The 
basic idea is that men specialize in paid work and invest more in job-specific skills, 
whereas women specialize in childcare and choose mother-friendly occupations 
that demand less effort and less intensive training. Employers thus pay lower 
wages in female-dominated occupations because workers’ marginal productivity 
in these occupations is lower than in male-dominated ones. This productivity dif-
ferential stems from two mechanisms. One mechanism is unequal investment in 
human capital. Since women, on average, take on more responsibility for child-
rearing and housework than men, they are more likely to interrupt their employ-
ment careers and work part-time than men. This more tenuous attachment to paid 
work is expected to decrease the incentive for both women to invest in their 
own—and employers to invest in their female employees’—job-specific human 
capital (Polavieja 2008, 202; see also Polavieja 2012). Men should thus receive 
more on-the-job training. The resulting sex differences in job-specific skills and 
time spent in vocational training are held to be the crucial factor responsible for 
lower wages in female as opposed to male occupations (Tam 1997, 1656).
Tam (1997) is correct in asserting that male occupations will be more intensive 
in terms of job-specific vocational training. Vocational education was originally 
devised to train craftsmen and is thus still more relevant to male-dominated than 
female-dominated occupations. And although women have surpassed men in grad-
uation rates from upper secondary general educational programs, they are still 
less likely than men to obtain an upper secondary vocational education (OECD 
2012, 53).2 For this reason, one underestimates the skill requirements of female 
occupations by only controlling for job-specific skills and not general skills.3
Several implications of this hypothesis can be tested empirically. To begin with, 
the wage gap between more male- or female-dominated occupations should disap-
pear once we account for differences in jobholders’ tenure and on-the-job training. 
Moreover, on-the-job training is tied to the way a country organizes vocational 
education—and here our study’s comparative setting may prove useful.
Vocational training is highly standardized and embedded in the national edu-
cational system in Germany and Switzerland, but acquired to a larger extent 
through informal on-the-job training in Britain—as in the United States (Charles 
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et al. 2001, 376). Job-related training should thus be captured, to some degree, in 
workers’ initial formal educational attainment in Germany and Switzerland’s 
apprenticeship system, but not in the more informal British (and American) sys-
tem of on-the-job training. Accordingly, job-specific skills should be more conse-
quential for the explanation of sex differences in occupational wages in Britain 
(and the United States) than in Germany and Switzerland.
Gender Specialization in the Household
A second mechanism stressed by New Home Economics originates in women’s 
greater investment into domestic work. The idea is that “child care and other 
housework are tiring and limit access to jobs requiring travel or odd hours” (Becker 
1985, S35). Married women and mothers are expected to avoid occupations that 
make greater demands in terms of constant availability, non-standard hours, over-
time work, or business travel. By selecting themselves into less onerous occupations 
with lower financial rewards, women exchange lower wages for more “family-
friendly” working conditions (Polavieja 2008, 200). Feminizing occupations may 
become less attractive in terms of wages, but instead offer more predictable work 
schedules or desirable working hours than male-dominated occupations.
We can again spell out the argument’s implications for the empirical analysis. The 
idea of compensating differentials should apply to women with children, but not to 
childless women. The moment at which gender specialization should negatively 
affect women’s careers is the birth of the first child (Becker 1985). If household spe-
cialization is the key mechanism, it is difficult to see why women without children 
should be more likely than men to waive earnings in order to get a less demanding, 
though more comfortable and family-friendly, job. More generally, controls for indi-
vidual differences in time spent on housework and childcare (investment into the 
household) and time on overtime work (investment into the job) should explain 
away any negative effect of the share of women in an occupation.
At the country level, women with children may be more willing (or harder pressed) 
to forego earnings for family-friendly working conditions if the alternative—the 
typical full-time job held by men—means very long working hours. In this respect, 
Switzerland seems to be least family-friendly, with 84 percent of men working 40 
hours or more, followed by Germany with 64 percent and Britain with 62 percent. 
As a consequence, women are more likely to work less than 30 hours per week in 
Switzerland (46 percent) than in Britain (39 percent) or Germany (38 percent) 
(OECD family database, data for 2012–13). We find the same rank order in the 
index of family policy developed by Mandel and Semyonov (2006, 1923), where 
Switzerland is at the very bottom of the distribution, Germany in the lowest fourth, 
and Britain in the lowest third of twenty-two affluent Western countries. Accord-
ingly, we expect women’s investment into domestic work to be more consequential 
for the gender wage gap in Switzerland than in either Britain or Germany.
Gendered Valuation of Occupations
Counter to the mechanisms discussed above, sociological theories refute the 
notion that wages are determined solely by workers’ marginal productivity. For 
Lalive and Stutzer (2010, 936), the importance of the bargaining process for 
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wage setting strongly suggests that non-economic factors also affect people’s 
earnings. According to the “cultural devaluation” perspective, one such factor is 
a gender norm that privileges men over women on the labor market and desig-
nates more value to male work than female work (England, Allison, and Wu 
2007, 1238). A possible mechanism behind gendered valuation is that many 
female jobs involve care activities—activities that have been recently externalized 
from the household to the labor-market and still carry the stigma of being closely 
tied to private household tasks (Bradley 1989).
Lalive and Stutzer (2010, 937) review an extensive literature in social psy-
chology, which shows that both women and men consider it appropriate for 
earnings to be lower for women than men (e.g., Jasso and Webster 1997). Like-
wise, experimental research consistently finds that women tend to pay them-
selves lower earnings and ask for less in wage bargaining than do men (e.g., 
Säve-Söderbergh 2007). A British study finds that women are just as likely to 
be promoted as men—yet the wage rewards associated with promotion are 
lower for women than men (Booth, Francesconi, and Frank 2003, 314). Simi-
larly, a Swedish analysis of matched employee-firm data reports that male 
employees participate to a greater extent in firm profits than female employees 
(Nekby 2003).
The gendered valuation of occupations and skills makes it difficult to interpret 
the effect of having children on wages. Men may earn higher wages once they 
have children, not because they become workaholics and devote more time to 
their job, but because fatherhood may bestow higher social status on men as the 
family breadwinner and thereby increase their moral bargaining power in wage 
negotiations.
It is notoriously difficult to set up an empirical test of the cultural devaluation 
hypothesis. Traditionally, the existence of cultural devaluation—or active dis-
crimination—has been indirectly inferred from the size of an occupation’s 
 sex-composition coefficient, after controlling for differences in workplace 
 characteristics and human capital. We also have to rely on this procedure.
At the country level, the devaluation theory may lead to two opposite expeca-
tions. On the one hand, we might expect that in countries with a more egalitarian 
gender ideology, such as Britain, the process of gender devaluation may be weaker 
than in the more conservative countries of Germany and, above all, Switzerland.4 
However, rather than ideology, we expect institutions, and notably the extent of 
coordination in wage-setting institutions, to be more consequential for the impact 
that gender devaluation may have on wages. To the extent that the collective 
bargaining over, and coordination of, wages includes more stakeholders and thus 
creates a system of checks and balances, wages in occupations may be more 
closely linked to objectively measurable dimensions of worker productivity—and 
hence reduce employers’ scope for “valuative discrimination” of female work 
(Petersen and Saporta 2004; Mandel and Semyonov 2006). In this respect, Brit-
ain’s liberal market economy gives much leeway to employers and single firms, 
facilitating unilateral management control over wages in most workplaces. 
In contrast, in Germany’s more coordinated market economy, collective agree-
ments at the industry level and powerful works councils at the firm level should 
limit the extent of gender devaluation. While organized labor is weaker in 
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 Switzerland than Germany, the extent of coordination in wage  bargaining  is sim-
ilar (Soskice 2005). Accordingly, the hypothesis of gendered valuation leads us to 
expect a greater impact of women’s share in an occupation on wages in Britain 
than in Switzerland and, above all, Germany.
Gender Differences in Power Resources
Gendered valuation is one explanation for lower wages in female occupations. 
Another explanation emphasizes different positions of power. Power resources 
interact with social norms to become highly salient in wage bargaining. Eileen 
Appelbaum argues that “wages depend largely on the respective bargaining 
power of business and labor, and on … normative factors” (in Jacobs and Stern-
berg 1990, 460). Subordinate groups such as women and minority men are seen 
as having less political power and thus less leverage to bargain over wages 
 (Catanzarite 2003, 17).
One evident mechanism through which power resources affect wages is trade 
union representation. Unionization has been identified as a “closure” strategy, by 
which workers in certain industries and occupations act collectively to use the 
threat of labor withdrawal in order to maximize their bargaining power (Weeden 
2002). Union contracts thereby promote wage levels in covered occupations 
above those which workers’ skills would dictate—a pay premium for power. 
Again, as with social norms, the effect of differential bargaining power is difficult 
to capture empirically. One approximation is union membership: union members 
should benefit from collective bargaining and receive, all else equal, higher wages 
than nonmembers.
Through their history as organizers of craft and industrial workers, trade 
unions have traditionally been stronger in male than in female occupations. Male 
union dominance has waned in some countries as jobs in public services have 
replaced manufacturing as the primary union stronghold. As of 2002, women’s 
union density rates have consequently surpassed those of men in Britain. Yet, it is 
not clear that these newer unions are as strong in closing off particular (female) 
occupations as they were in closing male craft occupations in the past (Weeden 
2002, 89). In comparison, Germany’s union movement still remains squarely in 
male hands, with men’s union density rate being twice that of women’s in the 
early 2000s (Visser 2011). While data on union density by gender are less system-
atic in Switzerland, survey evidence suggests that male density rates are 1.6 times 
those of women’s (Oesch 2006, 170). Union membership should be more perti-
nent in explaining any wage gap between male and female occupations in Ger-
many and Switzerland than in Britain.
Overview of the Hypotheses
In sum, our study examines four hypotheses of the effect occupational feminiza-
tion has on wages (see table 1). Hypothesis 1 highlights sex differences in accu-
mulated job-specific skills. It predicts no effect of occupational feminization on 
earnings once all the standard human capital variables and measures for tenure 
and on-the-job training have been taken into account. On-the-job training should 
be particularly consequential for the earnings gap between male and female 
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 occupations in Britain, but less so in Germany and Switzerland, where these skills 
are, to a larger extent, acquired in formal education.
Hypothesis 2 emphasizes gender differences in housework and expects women 
to accept lower wages in return for less exacting working conditions. The wage 
effect of occupational feminization should disappear once we control for wom-
en’s greater investment into childcare and housework, and men’s greater invest-
ment into paid work through overtime. This effect should be stronger, the more 
conservative a country’s family policy is—and hence more marked in Switzerland 
than in Germany and Britain.
Hypothesis 3 focuses on gendered valuation and argues that employers consider 
female jobs to be inherently less valuable than male jobs. It expects the wage gap 
between female and male occupations to persist even though differences in human 
capital, childcare, and housework are accounted for. This wage gap should be 
larger in liberal market economies, such as Britain, with more unilateral employer 
control over wages, than in coordinated market economies, such as Germany or 
Switzerland, where a closer nexus between the educational and wage system makes 
the occupational wage structure less sensitive to normative pressures.
Table 1. Overview of the Hypotheses
Hypothesis Focus Mechanism
Country 
difference
Outcome—Gender 
wage gap
H1 Investment 
into job-
specific  
skills
Disparity in 
job-specific skills 
explains the wage 
gap between 
male and female 
occupations
Controlling 
for on-the-job 
training should 
decrease wage 
gap more in GB 
than CH and DE
Productivity-
related: no longer 
significant
H2 Investment 
into paid 
work and 
childcare
Women forego 
wages for a 
job with more 
family-friendly 
working 
conditions
Controlling 
for gendered 
investment should 
decrease wage gap 
more in CH than 
DE and GB
Productivity-
related: no longer 
significant
H3 Cultural 
devaluation
Gender norms 
ascribe higher 
value to male 
than female work
After controls, 
wage gap should 
be larger in liberal 
than coordinated 
countries: in GB 
than DE or CH
Discrimination 
persists: effect 
remains negative
H4 Power 
resources 
and union 
membership
Male occupations 
are more effective 
in collective 
organization, 
where higher 
bargaining power 
generates pay 
premiums
Controlling for 
unions should 
decrease wage 
gap more in 
DE than in 
CH and GB
Discrimination 
persists: effect 
remains negative
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Hypothesis 4 highlights the role of power and union membership, and expects 
unionization to serve as a closure mechanism that operates through collective 
wage bargaining. Union membership should be a strong mediating factor of the 
wage gap between women’s and men’s occupations in Germany, where male 
occupations have been most successful in leveraging power to achieve pay premi-
ums, and in Switzerland, where unionization is still heavily male, but less so in 
Britain.
Data, Measures, and Method
Data
Our empirical analysis is based on longitudinal data from the British House-
hold Panel (BHPS), the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), and the Swiss 
Household Panel (SHP). These nationally representative surveys collect infor-
mation on a wide range of respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics and 
labor-force participation. We draw on unbalanced panels that comprise eigh-
teen waves of data from the BHPS (1991–2009) (Taylor et al. 2010), twenty 
waves (1991–2010) from the SOEPv27 (Wagner, Frick, and Schupp 2007), 
and thirteen waves (1999–2011) from the SHP, including booster samples5 
(Voorpostel et al. 2010).
We restrict our estimations to employees (age twenty-four to legal retirement 
age)6 working 15 hours or more per week.7 The self-employed and those in the 
armed forces, full-time education, or government schemes are excluded, as the 
wage-setting process of these workers is markedly different. Observations with 
missing values on relevant covariates are dropped from our analysis. This leaves 
us with a British sample of 4,700 women and 4,808 men, a German sample with 
7,235 women and 8,812 men, and a Swiss sample with 2,147 women and 2,427 
men. On average, men appear in a total of twelve years and women in eleven 
years of the British panel; men in eleven years and women in ten years in the 
 German sample; and men in eight years and women in seven years in the Swiss 
sample. Each person contributes a minimum of two years (summary statistics for 
each sample can be found in the Supplementary material online).
Individual and Occupational Measures
The first decision to be made is how to aggregate over 300 occupations in our 
three samples. Many of these occupations are empty in some waves and too small 
in other waves to permit robust wage estimations. Therefore, we group occupa-
tions according to the “micro-class” concept introduced by Grusky and Weeden 
(2001).8 This classification combines occupational categories on the basis of their 
social closure, which is brought about through wage-bargaining processes 
(unionization), access to training, and returns to education. It provides us with a 
coherent, cross-nationally comparable measure of eighty-four occupations. One 
drawback of this classification is the loss of detail in terms of jobs actually per-
formed by men and women—and previous research indicates that the wage effect 
of occupational feminization is the greater, the finer the job decomposition 
(Tomaskovic-Devey and Skaggs 2002, 105).
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Our dependent variable is the natural logarithm of individuals’ gross monthly 
wages, expressed in real terms: constant 2005 pounds sterling (for Britain), 2005 
euros (for Germany), and 2005 Swiss francs (for Switzerland).9 To ensure that 
potential outliers arising from measurement error do not bias our wage equa-
tions, we drop 1 percent of observations at the bottom of the wage distribution.
Our key independent variable is the share of women in a given occupation. 
This share ranges from 0 to 100 and is calculated for each year on the basis of 
the Labor Force Survey for Britain (UK-LFS, spring quarter 1991–2008),10 the 
Socio-Economic Panel for Germany (SOEP 1990–2010), and the Swiss Labor 
Force Survey (SLFS 1998–2011). In order to eliminate spurious variation due 
to small samples, we average the weighted proportions across two years for 
Germany and Switzerland. This allows us to calculate the share of women for a 
given occupation in 1991 by taking the mean proportion of women in 1990 and 
1991, and so on.
By taking an annual measure, we address a shortcoming of the few panel stud-
ies in the feminization literature. The feminization of occupations implies that 
shares of women are growing and vary over time. However, in previous longitu-
dinal studies, the share of women in occupations has been measured at one single 
point in time and therefore kept artificially stable over the observation period 
(e.g., England 1988; an exception is MacPherson and Hirsch [1995]). This means 
that fixed-effects analyses are limited to the fraction of workers who change jobs. 
In not constraining the share of women in an occupation to be the same across 
years, and observing change over a longer time period, we broaden our scope. 
This allows us to test the effect of both remaining in a feminizing occupation, and 
moving from male to female occupations, on a worker’s monthly wages.
The highest percentage of workers who move between occupations is observed in 
our British data, where 67 percent of men (n = 3,217) and 63 percent of women (n = 
2,959) change occupation over the time period 1991–2008. In Germany, this concerns 
52 percent of men (n = 4,588) and 43 percent of women (n = 3,123) for the period 
1991–2010. In the shorter Swiss panel (1999–2011), occupational transitions are less 
numerous, with 27 percent of men (n = 663) and 23 percent of women (n = 499) 
changing occupation. Some of the most frequent transitions are from clerical and 
office occupations to bookkeepers in Britain, or from clerical and office occupations 
to government officials and nonprofit workers in Germany and Switzerland.
Besides occupational transitions, a second source of variance stems from the 
changing share of women within an occupation over time. Examples of occupa-
tions that were strongly feminizing between the first and last time point are jurists 
in Britain (1991–2008: +18 percentage points, from 39 to 57 percent), accoun-
tants in Germany (1991–2010: +33 p.p., from 10 to 43 percent), or statistical and 
social scientists in Switzerland (1999–2011: +20 p.p., from 36 to 56 percent). 
This means that although individuals in our sample experience greater change in 
the share of women in their occupation when they switch jobs, remaining in a 
feminizing occupation also contributes substantial variance to our analyses. We 
control for switching jobs by introducing into our wage equations a dummy (0/1) 
indicating a change in occupation.
The usual determinants in wage equations make up our independent vari-
ables: number of hours normally worked per week (delimited to 50 hours), 
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current job and firm tenure, part-time status, temporary contract, past unem-
ployment experience, and detailed regional controls.11 A series of one-digit 
industry (NACE),12 public sector, and firm size dummies should control for 
workplace characteristics and pick up industry-specific skills (Tomaskovic-
Devey and Scraggs 2002; Tam 1997).
Good measures for accumulated individual skill and human capital are central 
to the study of occupational feminization and wages. For all three countries, we 
construct the same three educational levels (low, intermediary, high) based on the 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). Work experience in 
the German models is a measure of total years spent in full-time work, with the 
exception of those who reported only part-time work experience. Unfortunately, 
we are forced to approximate work experience using age in the British models. 
While this is problematic given the differences in spells of inactivity between men 
and women, previous studies using the BHPS suggest that—once other variables 
such as tenure are properly controlled for—age serves as a reasonable proxy for 
work experience (see Bryan and Sevilla-Sanz 2011).
In order to measure occupational differences in general skill requirements, we 
construct an aggregate measure of an occupation’s educational level by averaging 
the share of people with low (score of 0), intermediate (score of 0.5), and high 
education (score of 1). We measure job-skill specialization for Britain and 
 Switzerland by matching from the Labor Force Surveys an occupation’s share of 
incumbents who received any form of training or work-related courses in the 
reference year. This occupational measure is supplemented by an individual indi-
cator for training received in the reference year of the panel. For Switzerland, as 
a further test of training-occupation match and to control for unobserved skill 
specialization that might result from tenure, we include a binary indicator 
(no = 0; yes = 1) in answer to “Do your qualifications correspond to your job?” 
The German models contain three precise binary indicators of self-reported job 
training requirements, coded 1 if a job requires on-the-job training, special 
courses, or further training, such as technical college.
Differential investment into work and household is captured with variables for 
unpaid overtime hours per week, marital/cohabiting status, hours spent on house-
work per week, and the number of dependent children in the household. Hours 
of housework are capped at 50 hours per week, while unpaid overtime in the 
main job is originally capped at 23 hours in the German data, and imposed as 28 
hours per week for Britain.13
Most pertinent to theories of power resources is union coverage at the firm 
level. The British models test for whether a person’s workplace has an established 
union. For the Swiss SHP, we have information only on individual membership in 
a work association or a trade union. The same question on union membership 
was asked in the German SOEP, but only in five waves (1993, 1998, 2001, 2003, 
2007).14
Occupational feminization is likely to take place in occupations for which there 
is growing labor demand—and change in labor demand is largely exogenous, 
driven by technology (Oesch 2013). Since labor demand likely affects the evolu-
tion of our key parameters—occupational feminization and wages—we need to 
control for it. We do so by introducing a measure of the annual share of total 
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employment in a given occupation (based on the Labor Force Surveys for Britain 
and Switzerland, and SOEP for Germany). Over the study period, the annual 
employment share decreases for occupations such as metal fitters and office clerks, 
but increases for occupations such as health semiprofessionals and managers.
Model Specification
In analyzing the effect of occupational feminization on wages, we must address 
the issue of unobserved heterogeneity. Notably the theories of New Home Eco-
nomics imply that unmeasured abilities and preferences may explain the negative 
association between rising shares of women in an occupation and wages. The 
idea is that women and men select themselves into certain occupations, which 
carry different wage returns, on the basis of personal attributes not easily 
observed in survey data. Occupations that are more “female” attract less produc-
tive women, who sort into less demanding jobs because they prioritize family care 
over paid work (MacPherson and Hirsch 1995).
The advantage of fixed-effects panel models is that they eliminate time-invari-
ant, unmeasured characteristics, such as individual preferences, capabilities, and 
motivations, which can affect wage trajectories (Halaby 2004). The fixed-effects 
(within) estimator only takes account of the variance stemming from changes in 
individuals’ lives over time, and not differences between individuals. We thus 
estimate a fixed-effects model that uses individual deviations from person-specific 
means. The general equation for our linear regressions is given below:
 Y tit it i it= + + + + + = …+β β β β γ0 1 2 3 1 2W HFEMit it t Tα ε ,( , , ),  
where Y is the logarithm of real monthly wages for an individual i in an occupation 
at time t. W is a vector of workplace, regional, occupational, and human capital 
controls. Our main predictor is a time-varying measure of the share of women in a 
given occupation, FEM, for individual i at time t; H represents a vector of the time-
varying predictors from the hypotheses (JSS, DHI, or Unions), with γt year dum-
mies to condition out wage trends. We remove all time-invariant characteristics 
that differ between individuals and occupations by allowing α, a set of unobserved 
time-constant variables, to correlate with all of our individual and occupational 
predictors, where εit represents random error at time t (Allison 2009). The meth-
od’s limitation is that we cannot eliminate unobserved time-varying characteristics 
that affect both an occupation’s share of women and individual wages.
Regressions are estimated separately for men and women, and we adopt a 
stepwise approach. The independent variables relevant for each hypothesis are 
added to our baseline model, and are then removed, to examine net effects. In a 
second analysis, we test for nonlinear wage effects as an occupation feminizes by 
decomposing the share of women in an occupation into percentage bands.
Findings on the Wage Effect of Occupational Feminization
We begin our analysis with descriptive statistics. Figures 1a to 1c show how 
an occupation’s monthly wages vary depending on the share of women in the 
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occupation. Unlike our subsequent multivariate analysis, this computation is set 
at the aggregate level of occupations and focuses on occupational median wages. 
Three results are noteworthy.
First, we observe systematically higher median wages for men than women, 
regardless of the share of women who work in an occupation. The male-female 
wage gap is largest in occupations holding from 50 to 60 percent women in  Britain, 
70 to 80 percent women in Switzerland, and 90 to 100 percent women in Germany.
Second, median wage is highest in occupations that employ from 10 to 20 
percent of women in Germany, 20 to 30 percent of women in Switzerland, and 40 
to 50 percent of women in Britain. Wages then gradually decline as women’s 
Figure 1. Share of women in an occupation and an occupation’s median gross monthly 
wage
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share in an occupation increases. Female median wages in occupations with a 
share of 80 to 90 percent women are substantially lower than female median 
wages in occupations with a share of 30 to 40 percent women—a 38 percent dif-
ferential in Britain, 21 percent in Germany, and 13 percent in Switzerland. This 
suggests that wage disparities between male- and female-dominated occupations 
are higher in Britain than in Germany and, above all, Switzerland.
Third, men’s median wages come closest to women’s in occupations employing 
more than 90 percent men, though wages are still higher than at the female end of 
the occupational distribution. We deal here with mostly low-skilled occupations 
in production and crafts such as heavy machine operatives or mechanics—and 
technological change has depressed firms’ demand for these jobs over the past few 
decades (Oesch 2013, Murphy 2014). Lower wage levels in heavily male- dominated 
occupations suggest that the relationship between shares of women in an occupa-
tion and earnings is not linear—a hypothesis to which we return later on.
We move on from descriptive statistics to estimate wage equations for British 
women and men, German women and men, and Swiss women and men. These 
analyzes are set at the individual level, and the dependent variable is logged 
monthly earnings. In a first OLS baseline model M0(OLS), we simply introduce 
the key independent variable “female share in an occupation” (henceforth FEM), 
alongside controls for time (in years), normal hours worked per week, and labor 
demand (the share of employment in a given occupation). In a second baseline 
model M0(FE), we introduce individual fixed effects alongside the same three 
control variables. We then keep fixed effects and add, in two subsequent models, 
controls for workplace characteristics (M1) and standard human capital (M2). 
The following models (M3 to M5) provide tests of three of our hypotheses: M3 
introduces several measures for job-specific skills; M4 includes several variables 
for household and work investment; and M5 integrates union membership. 
Finally, M6 provides the results of a full model. For clarity, table 2 shows only the 
coefficients for our key variable FEM (complete models are found in the appen-
dix; see tables A.1 to A.3).
What are our main findings? The two baseline models (M0) show that remov-
ing unobserved heterogeneity makes a considerable difference. For women, the 
wage penalty of staying in, or moving to, a feminizing occupation is roughly 
halved when we move from OLS to fixed effects and look only at within-person 
changes over time. Women who work in female-dominated occupations thus 
seem to differ from women who work in more male-dominated occupations—
their earnings potential being lower. This doesn’t apply to men: men’s wage pen-
alty remains the same in Britain, changes from positive to negative in Germany, 
but is reduced in Switzerland when we use fixed effects.
Both baseline models suggest that moving from a male to a female occupa-
tion—or staying within an occupation that feminizes—entails a sizeable wage 
loss. Adding controls for the workplace (M1) and general human capital (M2) 
makes no difference: the wage penalty associated with FEM amounts to about 15 
percent for British women, British men, and Swiss women, and to about 5 percent 
for German women, German men, and Swiss men.15
The hypothesis that job-specific skills go some way toward explaining why 
wages are lower in female than in male occupations is supported by our third 
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model. Once we introduce controls for job-specific skills (M3), the wage loss 
associated with moving from a fully male to a fully female occupation remains 
basically unchanged for British women and men, but becomes substantially 
smaller for German women and men, and above all, for Swiss women and men. 
The effect of FEM becomes close to 0 for Swiss men and shrinks from 14 to 7 
percent for Swiss women. Differential acquisition in job-specific skills in male 
and female occupations thus clearly matters. However, the wage penalty associ-
ated with FEM does not disappear altogether: all the coefficients remain negative 
in Germany and Switzerland.
Contrary to our country hypothesis, controlling for job-specific skills does 
nothing to reduce the massive wage gap between male and female occupations in 
Britain, but does lead to smaller effects of FEM in Germany and Switzerland. This 
suggests that in the two German-speaking countries, the acquisition of vocational 
skills continues over the life course (to a greater extent than in Britain).
The model controlling for differential investment into housework shows that 
unpaid overtime work on the job is systematically associated, for both men and 
women, with higher earnings, whereas hours devoted to housework lead to lower 
earnings. Gender differences emerge with respect to two other characteristics of 
household upkeep: being married and having dependent children. While marriage 
increases wages equally for men and women in Britain, its beneficial effect on 
wages is limited to men in Germany and Switzerland, whereas women seem to 
lose from it. More marked is the gender difference with respect to children. Even 
though we control for hours of housework, we still find that having children is 
associated with lower pay for women in all three countries. Having two or more 
children in the household entails a substantial decrease in women’s wages, from 
5 (German women), to 8 (Swiss women) and 9 percent (British women). For men, 
having children has no negative effect—on the contrary, the coefficients are weak 
but positive in all three countries.
By and large, we thus obtain the wage effects of overtime, marriage, and chil-
dren predicted by New Home Economics. However, we do not know whether 
women’s wage penalty, and men’s wage bonus, associated with children is due to 
productivity or discrimination. More importantly, these measures of differential 
investment into work and the household fail to explain why moving into female 
occupations is associated with lower wages for men and women. When introduc-
ing these measures into the wage equation alongside workplace and human cap-
ital controls, the coefficients for FEM remain unchanged in Germany and 
Switzerland—and they only slightly reduce the (still substantial) wage penalty 
associated with FEM in Britain. Again, our country hypothesis is not supported. 
Differential investment in the household does no more to explain away the wage 
loss associated with FEM in Switzerland, the country with the most conservative 
family policy, than in Britain or Germany.
Our model M5 incorporates union coverage, or union membership. While we 
observe a strong positive effect of workplace unions on wages in Britain, union 
presence does not account for the differences in wages between male and female 
occupations. In Germany and Switzerland, the wage bonus of union membership 
is small and statistically significant only for Swiss women. In all three countries, 
the introduction of union coverage or membership into our wage equation has 
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no impact on our key independent variable FEM. Accordingly, we find no evi-
dence for this hypothesis at either the individual or country level.
Finally, when estimating a full model M6, which integrates all of our control 
variables, we basically obtain the same coefficients for FEM as in model M3, 
which includes the measures for job-specific skills (alongside workplace charac-
teristics and general humal capital). Crucially, we still observe a wage penalty 
associated with working in occupations that have high shares of women—
although we introduce about twenty-five measures for workplace characteristics, 
general and job-specific human capital, as well as the household. This residual 
wage penalty is large for British women and men (12–13 percent), non-negligable 
for Swiss women (6 percent), and small for German women and men (2–3 per-
cent). At this stage, the only hypothesis consistent with this result seems to be 
gendered valuation: the perception of both employers and employees that male 
work is more valuable than female work.
However, we further probe the plausibility of Gary Becker’s differential invest-
ment hypothesis by looking at different subsamples. His argument that women 
specialize in housework and thus choose less demanding jobs should apply only 
to women with children—but not to childless women. Specifically, his theory 
points to the birth of a child as the time at which women’s work productivity 
begins to fall. Women without children seem unlikely to forego higher wages for 
more family-friendly working conditions. We thus reestimate the full model 6 for 
a sample that includes only women without children in the household. Since 
women may make career choices based on planned fertility, their wages poten-
tially decrease a year or two before the first child is born—as they look for a 
family-friendly job before entering motherhood. For this reason, we limit the 
Table 3. The Effect of Occupational Feminization on (logged) Monthly Wages for Women 
without Children
M6a FE
Women without children
M6b FE
Women without children at 
present and in near future
Britain –0.09 (0.02) –0.09 (0.02)
n individuals 3,714 3,620
Germany –0.04 (0.02) –0.04 (0.02)
n individuals 5,596 5,546
Switzerland –0.07 (0.05) –0.09 (0.05)
n individuals 1,644 1,305
Source: BHPS; SHP; SOEP.
Note: bold p < 0.05
Model M6a excludes women with children in the household (mothers); Model M6b excludes 
women with children (mothers at present) and women who report a child in the household one 
to two years later (future mothers). The same controls are included as in model M6 (see table 2 
for details).
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 samples first to women without children and then further to women without chil-
dren in the household that remain childless in two subsequent waves of our panels.
The results are shown in table 3 and suggest that, contrary to the expectation of 
New Home Economics, occupational feminization affects not only the wages of 
women with children, but also those of childless women. Although the productiv-
ity of women without children in the household is not hampered by childcare, the 
wage penalty associated with FEM is substantial: for childless women, the wage 
decrease of moving from a completely male occupation to a completely female 
occupation amounts to 9 percent in Britain, 7 to 9 percent in Switzerland, and 4 
percent in Germany.
Next we tackle the question of whether the effect of FEM on wages is linear. 
Differential valuation of work may become apparent only once an occupation 
becomes female typed. We examine the existence of a tipping point in FEM’s impact 
on wages by estimating a full model where our continuous variable FEM is decom-
posed into six bands: less than 30 percent women, 30–40 percent, 40–50 percent, 
50–60 percent, 60–70 percent, and more than 70 percent women in an occupation.
Figure 2 presents the regression coefficients by showing the percentage change in 
an individual’s wage associated with working in male occupations (reference cate-
gory of 0–30 percent women in an occupation) to increasingly female occupations. 
These figures clearly demonstrate that the impact of occupational feminization on 
wages is not linear, but sets apart occupations holding over a 60 percent share of 
women. As long as women do not outnumber men in an occupation, it makes little 
difference for wages whether women’s share is 10 or 40 percent in the three 
Figure 2. Wage evolution (in %) from male (0–30% women) to feminizing occupations—Britain 
1991–2009, Germany 1991–2010, Switzerland 1999–2011
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 countries under study; the tipping point is reached when an occupation becomes 
numerically dominated by women, and thereby “female” typified.
Despite introducing all our controls for human capital, job-specific skills, and 
household investment, the dampening wage effect of FEM apparent in the previ-
ous linear regressions is still visible in Britain, Germany, and Switzerland (note 
that in Switzerland, the sample size is small and the standard errors large, leading 
to coefficients that are no longer statistically significant). The wage penalty asso-
ciated with an occupation becoming female typed, at 60 percent FEM, amounts 
to 5 percent for British women and 2 percent for German men and women. In 
Britain, the costs of occupational feminization are somewhat higher for men than 
for women: moving from a male-dominated to an occupation of 60 to 70 percent 
women entails a wage decline of 7 percent for British men.
While our results strongly suggest that occupational feminization is accompa-
nied by a wage penalty, they leave us to question why we observe a much stronger 
effect in Britain than in Germany or Switzerland. Our country hypothesis 
expected a larger scope for gendered valuation—employers’ latitude to set wages 
according to gender perceptions—in countries with a more deregulated wage 
structure, such as Britain, than in countries with widepread wage coordination, 
as in Germany or Switzerland. The argument is that it is wage coordination and 
formal rules—in other words, whether qualifications are closely or loosely tied to 
the general wage-determination system—rather than specific gender policies that 
have the strongest impact on women’s relative pay position (Rubery et al. 1997). 
Evidence for this hypothesis is that Germany and Switzerland had consistently 
lower levels of wage inequality over the 1990s and early 2000s than Britain 
(OECD 2011, 87). We analyze this hypothesis by replacing monthly wages with 
individuals’ annual wage percentile ranking within each country.16 Annual per-
centile rankings allow us to standardize—and thus cancel out—differences in 
wage inequality across our three countries.
We reestimate models M0 to M6 with normalized wage percentile ranking as 
the outcome variable (see table A.4 in the appendix). Although we still find a size-
able wage penalty associated with the share of women in an occupation, country 
differences do not become smaller. Based on this measure, FEM entails a relative 
wage loss for Swiss women that is almost as large as for British women and men. 
As opposed to this, German women, German men, and Swiss men still stand out 
as being less affected by the share of women in an occupation. Different levels of 
wage inequality do not directly explain why remaining in, or moving into, a 
feminizing occupation entails a much larger wage decrease in Britain than in 
Germany.
Our last step is to analyze whether wage coordination and formal rules 
decrease employer discretion in setting wages according to their perception of an 
occupation’s worth. We do so by examining the private and public sector sepa-
rately. The idea is that wage-setting in the public sector adheres more to the logic 
of formal rules and standard procedures, whereas the private sector gives greater 
latitude to employers’ personal evaluations. We thus estimate a full model M6 on 
two different subsamples (private/public) where the dependent variable is logged 
monthly wages and the key independent variable is the share of women in an 
occupation, decomposed into the same six categories as in figure 2 above.
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The results are shown in figure A.1 in the appendix and reveal that the wage 
penalty associated with working in a female occupation is systematically larger 
in the private sector than in the public sector in all three countries. The difference 
is striking for Germany and Switzerland, where there is a sizeable wage penalty 
associated with the share of women in an occupation in the private sector, but 
none in the public sector. On the contrary, coefficients suggest that there is even a 
small wage bonus associated with FEM in the public sector for men in Germany, 
and women and men in Switzerland. In Britain, we find a negative effect for FEM 
in both sectors. The wage penalty, however, is twice as large in the private sector 
compared to the public sector. This evidence is consistent with the expectations 
of gendered valuation, and the crucial role the general wage-setting system plays 
for women’s relative pay position.
Conclusion
This paper opened with the question of whether workers who remain in, or move 
into, feminizing occupations earn lower wages. A tentative answer from our 
panel-data analyses is that, in the absence of controls for differences in workplace 
characteristics and human capital, employment in a completely female occupa-
tion is associated with a substantially lower wage than employment in a com-
pletely male occupation. This wage penalty amounts to about 15 percent in 
Britain, Germany, and Switzerland. Once we account for differences in firm char-
acteristics, human capital, and job-specific skills, the effect of occupational femi-
nization on wages becomes more negligible for German women, German men, 
and Swiss men, but remains substantial for Swiss women and, above all, British 
women and men. In Britain, workers in an entirely female occupations earn 10 
percent lower wages—everything else being equal—than those in entirely male 
occupations.
Wage disparities between male and female occupations, contrary to the prevail-
ing idea in economics, do not disappear once we control for differences in workers’ 
productivity. Variation in job-specific skills, overtime work, childcare, and house-
work does not explain why British workers earn lower wages in female, as opposed 
to male, occupations. Crucially, it is not only women with children, but also child-
less women and men, who earn lower wages when working in female occupations. 
In addition, our fixed-effects estimation takes only variation within individuals 
over time into account. By controlling for time-constant unobserved characteris-
tics, we can discard the hypothesis that our results are driven by the fact that dif-
ferent people (e.g., more productive and ambitious workers) choose to work in 
different occupations (e.g., male and not female occupations). The implication is 
that factors beyond productivity must be operating.
Our analysis provides only partial support for the job-specific skill hypothe-
sis—and very little support for the differential investment hypothesis. Likewise, 
differences in union membership and union coverage cannot explain lower wages 
in female occupations. Belonging to a union and working in a unionized firm are 
admittedly imperfect measures of power resources in the labor market, which 
makes our evidence in this respect tentative at best.
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How can we interpret the failure of these different hypotheses to explain the 
wage impact of occupational feminization? Our reading of these findings is sim-
ple: wage disparities between male and female occupations are, to some extent, 
rooted in unequal gender norms that accord higher value to male work effort, 
and thus imply labor-market discrimination against women.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material is available at Social Forces online, http://sf.oxfordjourn-
als.org/.
Notes
1. Another argument that we do not pursue in this paper relates to the crowding of 
women in a few occupations. The idea is that employer discrimination—or  women’s 
own preferences—leads women to seek employment in a few female occupations, 
resulting in excess supply, which drives down wages (Bergmann 1974; Grönlund and 
Magnusson 2013).
2. For upper secondary general education, the graduation rates in the OECD were 56 
percent for women, but only 44 percent for men in 2010. In contrast, graduation rates 
from vocational programs were 32 percent for women and 37 percent for men.
3. This point is well demonstrated by England et al. (2000) in their reply to Tam (1997).
4. Note with respect to conservative gender ideology that in Switzerland women’s suf-
frage was introduced, on the national level, only in 1971, gender equality in the con-
stitution only in 1981, and gender equality in matrimonial law only in 1988.
5. We exclude the Northern Ireland sample in the BHPS, and the high-earner sample (G) 
in SOEP.
6. While the legal retirement age is identical in the three countries for men, it varies for 
women. Accordingly, our sample consists of men aged 24–64 and women aged 24–59 
in Britain, 24–64 for women and men in Germany, and men aged 24–64 and women 
aged 24–63 in Switzerland.
7. As a sensitivity check, we estimated our regressions excluding those on a part-time 
contract. This does not substantially alter our results.
8. We benefit from the crosswalks generated by Lambert and Griffiths (2011). These 
translate three-digit 1990 Standard Occupational Coding (SOC90) indicators in the 
British data, and four-digit 1988 International Standard Classification of Occupations 
(ISCO-88) in the Swiss and German data, with minor modifications, into the “micro-
class” scheme. More information can be found at http://www.geode.stir.ac.uk/.
9. Wages are deflated on the basis of Eurostat’s Consumer Price Index (CPI Eurostat index).
10. The years 1991 and 1992 refer to annual data, as the design of data collection began 
to operate on a quarterly basis only in 1993.
11. Up until 1996 in the SOEP, the question of “contract duration” was asked only of 
respondents who changed jobs in the reference year. Consequently, we assume con-
stancy across 1991–1995 if no change is reported. Neither an unemployment spell 
nor a tenure indicator is available for Switzerland. A question on employer tenure 
was asked only in the first four waves of the SHP, and as a consequence, indicators 
for tenure are absent in the Swiss models. In our checks for the effect of average 
occupational tenure (taken from the Swiss Labour Force Survey) in the job-specific 
skills models, estimates were largely unchanged.
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12. For 2007 in the Swiss data, industrial sector is imputed from the previous year if no 
changes in employer or job are reported, since the missing data reach 10 percent on 
this particular item, preventing us from dropping such a large portion of our sample.
13. The question of overtime hours is not asked in the SHP; as a check, we modeled an 
imperfect proxy calculation for overtime hours on the basis of usual hours minus 
contractual weekly hours, in addition to an aggregate of the proportion of individuals 
in an occupation who report 50 or more usual weekly hours. However, none of these 
measures changed our substantive results and were thus excluded.
14. We are only able to estimate our regressions for union membership on a reduced 
German sample consisting of five non-consecutive waves. In Switzerland, we exclude 
the year 2010 from our union models, as union membership was not asked in this 
wave.
15. Since wages are in log terms, we would need to transform the larger coefficients of our 
independent variables to obtain precise results; a coefficient of –0.15 for British women 
thus gives us 1 – exp (0.15) = 0.16; this corresponds to a 16 percent drop in wages.
16. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
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